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Abstract 
If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then 
they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively 
defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments 
demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse 
conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general 
statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were 
inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies 
a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based 
induction.  Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that 
the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983). 
 
KEYWORDS:  fallacy, conjunction, concepts, beliefs, intensional reasoning 
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Fallacies in category-based reasoning 
There have been many demonstrations of how people’s thinking appears to violate 
logical or statistical laws. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) famously showed 
that when people are told that someone called Bill is a rather dull individual, then under a 
variety of circumstances they will judge that a conjunctive statement (e.g. “Bill is an 
accountant who plays jazz for a hobby”) is more likely to be true than one of its conjuncts  
(e.g. “Bill plays jazz for a hobby”) even though this should be impossible by the 
conjunction law of probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman argued that the basis of this 
conjunction fallacy is the use of intensional reasoning (reasoning based on the similarity of 
descriptions of classes). People consider which description is most appropriate for Bill, and 
choose that as the most likely. Of course from the perspective of extensional reasoning, 
(reasoning based on considerations of class membership), such as the axioms underlying 
probability theory, the answer based on intensional reasoning is incorrect. 
The effects of intensional reasoning are not limited to subjective probability estimates. 
Similar fallacies also occur when people reason about semantic categories, as the following 
four examples illustrate. 1 First, Hampton (1982) demonstrated intransitivities in people’s 
classification judgments about everyday objects. For instance, people agreed that “A car 
headlight is a kind of lamp” and “A lamp is a kind of furniture”, but then denied that “A car 
headlight is a kind of furniture”. If these statements are understood as expressing beliefs 
about class inclusion (i.e. “All lamps are furniture”), then this pattern of belief violates the 
transitivity of the set inclusion relation of ordinary set theory. Second, in the context of 
category-based induction, Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, and Shafir (1990) demonstrated 
that people’s intuitions about argument strength are often not in accordance with classical 
logic. For example, argument (1) was judged to be stronger than argument (2): 
 (1) All robins have sesamoid bones; therefore all birds have sesamoid bones 
 (2) All robins have sesamoid bones; therefore all ostriches have sesamoid bones. 
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If all birds have a property then of course necessarily all ostriches must do so too, so (2) 
must be at least as strong as (1), if not stronger. (Argument strength here is taken to be 
something akin to the perceived conditional probability of the conclusion given the 
premise).  To show this, compare (2) with the rephrasing of (1) given in (1a): 
(1a) All robins have sesamoid bones; therefore all ostriches, and all other birds, 
have sesamoid bones. 
Since (1a) requires an additional proposition to be true in its conclusion, (1a) clearly cannot 
be stronger than (2).  Yet (1) and (1a) are logically equivalent. 
The two remaining examples were reported by Sloman (1993; 1998) in the context of 
category-based induction. In his premise specificity effect Sloman demonstrated that people 
are prone to judge arguments with more specific premises such as (3) to be stronger than 
arguments with more general premises such as (4) 
 (3) All birds have ulnars, therefore all robins have ulnars 
 (4) All animals have ulnars, therefore all robins have ulnars 
even though ordinary logic treats them as both perfectly strong, the class of robins being 
included in the class of birds which itself is included in the class of animals. In his inclusion 
similarity effect, Sloman showed that people are prone to judge arguments with typical 
conclusion categories such as (5) as stronger than arguments with less typical conclusion 
categories such as (6), even though, again, since mammals and reptiles are both included in 
the class of animals, classical logic treats them both as perfectly strong. 
(5) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter, therefore, all mammals 
use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter 
 (6) All animals use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter, therefore, all reptiles use 
norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter 
What these phenomena all have in common is that people are using similarity between 
concepts as the basis of their judgments, and as a result they are ignoring considerations 
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based on sets or class inclusion. Just as with the conjunction fallacy, Hampton (1982) 
argued that intransitivity in categorization arises from the use of similarity to make category 
membership judgments, together with the fact that there is greater similarity between (for 
example) headlights and lamps, and between lamps and furniture than there is between 
headlights and furniture. Similarity is not a transitive relation, and so categorization based 
on similarity may on occasion also be intransitive.  Likewise both Osherson et al. (1990) 
and Sloman (1993, 1998) proposed models to account for their induction effects in which 
similarity between premise and conclusion categories plays a major role. 
 To this list of fallacies we now add another, which we consider may reveal more 
directly the thought processes that lead to the latter three phenomena. According to 
common logical intuition, if a property is true of all members of a class, then it should also 
be true of any subset of that class.  Hence, if one agrees to the proposition “All humans are 
rational animals” one should be equally prepared to agree to the proposition “All humans 
born in the United States are rational animals”. More formally, in ordinary predicate logic, 
a statement of the form (7) (expressed verbally in 7a) 
 (7)  x((P(x)Q(x))R(x)) 
 (7a)   For all x, if x is p and x is q then x is r 
can be formally deduced from a statement of the form (8 / 8a) 
 (8)  x(P(x)R(x)) 
 (8a)   For all x, if x is p then x is r 
These deductions have substantial intuitive appeal (providing that p and q are not disjoint 
sets).  However, it will be the main aim of this article to demonstrate that people are often 
unprepared to agree to the more specific statement even though they agree to the general 
one.  Since the statements in question relate to actual beliefs about known properties (rather 
than hypothetical beliefs about blank predicates), we argue that this fallacy provides a more 
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direct demonstration of this style of conceptual reasoning, so that it can provide an 
important clue to understanding similarity based class inclusion fallacies more generally. 
The Inverse Conjunction Fallacy 
Our interest in exploring the possibility of this new fallacy came from a phenomenon 
reported by Connolly, Fodor, Gleitman, L.R., and Gleitman, H. (2003).  Connolly et al. 
claimed that many current theories of concept combination (Cohen & Murphy, 1984; 
Hampton, 1991; Murphy, 1988) embody a “default to the stereotype” strategy. A person 
“defaults to the stereotype” when he or she assumes that the representation corresponding 
to the meaning of a Modifier-Noun (MN) expression (e.g. “red apple”) is similar to the 
representation corresponding to the meaning of the relevant noun (N) expression (e.g. 
“apple”) in all respects that are orthogonal to the modifier. So if “is crunchy” is orthogonal 
to “is red” (in apples), red apples are represented as being just as crunchy as other apples 
are. Connolly et al. then showed that statements of the form “MN are P” are generally 
judged less likely to be true than matched statements of the form “N are P”, particularly 
when the modifier is atypical of the noun. Connolly et al. took this result as a demonstration 
that the default to stereotype strategy is not used in conceptual combination.  We have since 
replicated their result and believe it to be a robust finding, even though we are skeptical of 
the conclusions that they draw from it (Jönsson & Hampton, 2005). 
Connolly et al.’s (2003) experimental result suggested to us that people might be prone 
to entertain inconsistent thoughts in a way that has not hitherto been demonstrated. For if 
people are prone to assert that “Sofas have backrests” is more likely to be true than 
“Uncomfortable handmade sofas have backrests” they might also go so far as to agree with 
the universally quantified sentence “All sofas have backrests” while denying that “All 
uncomfortable handmade sofas have backrests”, which would be logically inconsistent (as 
noted above). Note that no inconsistency threatens if unquantified generic statements are 
used. Because generic statements carry a weaker implicit quantification such as “typically” 
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or “most” (see Krifka et al., 1995), the generic belief that “Sofas have backrests” is quite 
compatible with believing that some subclass of sofas do not have backrests. Hence, in 
order to demonstrate inconsistency in beliefs, it is crucial that the test sentences are 
explicitly universally quantified. 
In addition to providing evidence of a new form of similarity based fallacy, the 
proposed test is also critical to deciding between two accounts of Connolly et al.’s (2003) 
finding. They interpreted their result as showing that prototypical property information for a 
modified noun phrase is not inherited by default from the noun. In fact they argued that 
prototypes of concepts do not combine in any consistent compositional way – a conclusion 
that has been taken as a strong argument against concepts being prototypes (Fodor, 1998). 
Instead, concepts have to combine extensionally – something is in the class MN, just if it is 
both in the class M and in the class N.  If people combine the concepts extensionally in this 
way, then it should be clear that any property that is universally true of the members of 
either of the M or N sets should be universally true of the members of the combined 
concept. 
The alternative account of Connolly et al.’s (2003) result is the one that we favor 
(Jönsson and Hampton, 2005). A key part of our account is that, in keeping with 
psychological models of concept combination (Hampton, 1987; Murphy, 1988), properties 
are inherited by a complex concept in proportion to their importance or “definingness” for 
each of the constituent concepts. Thus the weight of the feature “has a back rest” for 
uncomfortable handmade sofas will be an average of its weight for sofas and its weight for 
uncomfortable handmade objects in general. (There are a number of exceptions to this rule 
– see Hampton, 1987, for evidence and details). Since uncomfortable handmade objects do 
not generally have backrests, the feature will carry less weight for the modified concept 
“uncomfortable handmade sofa” than for the unmodified concept “sofa”. (We also assume 
that there are no background knowledge or conceptual consistency effects involved here – 
Jönsson & Hampton  The Inverse Conjunction Fallacy   8 
see Murphy, 1988, 2002). According to this account, the addition of universal quantifiers to 
the statements is likely to change people’s judgments very little. It is our contention that 
people rarely think conceptually in terms of class inclusion or class intersection, as 
demonstrated in the examples of fallacious reasoning already given. Universally quantified 
sentences and generic sentences are likely to be treated similarly unless the context very 
clearly supports extensional reasoning. 
There are therefore two clearly different predictions about the outcome of our test. 
Extensional accounts of concept combination predict that people should consider the MN 
statement “All uncomfortable handmade sofas have backrests” to be no less likely to be true 
than the N statement “All sofas have backrests”, on the grounds that the latter entails the 
former. Alternatively, intensional models of concept combination predict that the modified 
noun statement will be considered less likely to be true, simply because the property is a 
feature of only one of the conjoined concepts, and not one that is considered necessarily 
true.  
We term this possible effect the inverse conjunction fallacy, in explicit 
acknowledgement of its close relation to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) well-known 
conjunction fallacy. There are actually three different ways in which one can exhibit the 
effect. The most direct contravention of logical constraints is to say “Yes” to the truth of a 
statement like “All sofas have backrests” while saying “No” to “All uncomfortable 
handmade sofas have backrests”. Accordingly we will call this pattern of responding 
Yes/No. It is clearly inconsistent given that uncomfortable handmade sofas are a subclass of 
sofas.  
The remaining two ways of being inconsistent relate to relative degrees of confidence in 
agreeing with or rejecting the two statements. If one agrees that both statements are true, it 
would still be inconsistent to express greater confidence in unmodified N statements than in 
modified MN statements. We will call this pattern of responding Yes/Yes. To illustrate this, 
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suppose that we model confidence in the truth of a statement in terms of the proportion of 
plausible possible worlds in which the statement would be true. So if my confidence in 
winning a bet were 20% that would be equivalent to my imagining 5 equally likely 
outcomes (five possible worlds), in 4 of which I lose, and in one of which I win. (See 
Lewis, 1986, or Stalnaker, 1984, for classical treatments of knowledge and belief in terms 
of possible worlds). Given this interpretation of confidence, believing that all N are P with 
greater confidence than that all MN are P is logically inconsistent since it would imply at 
least one possible world in which all N are P but not all MN are P.  (The same 
inconsistency arises if the possible worlds are not assumed to be equally likely.) 
The third way to display the inverse conjunction fallacy is the mirror image of the 
second way. Believing that not all N are P with lower confidence than believing that not all 
MN are P (the No/No pattern) is once again inconsistent. It would be equivalent to 
believing that the statement “Some MN is not P” is more likely than the statement “Some N 
is not P”.  But clearly whenever the former is true, then so is the latter. 
To clarify the relation between the two conjunction fallacies, Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1983) original conjunction fallacy occurs when people think it more likely that an 
individual is a member of a conjunction than a member of one of the conjuncts. It is 
therefore primarily a fallacy concerning the likelihood of an instance belonging in a set.  
Our inverse version of the fallacy is that people think it more likely that a property is 
universally true of one of the conjuncts than of a conjunction. Hence it is about the 
likelihood of a property being true of a set.  The inversion arises as a result of the switch 
from consideration of members (extensions) to consideration of properties (intensions). 
The first two experiments set out to investigate whether people are actually prone to 
make inverse conjunction fallacies. Student participants were tested in two designs. The 
between-subjects design (Experiment 1) divided the two versions of a statement between 
two groups of participants whereas the within-subjects design (Experiment 2) involved 
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giving both versions of a particular statement to the same individuals. The experiments 
were run in parallel with random allocation of participants to each experiment. It was 
predicted that if participants were at all sensitive to the potential inconsistency, then the 
fallacy would be more frequently found in the between-subjects design, where each 
statement was only seen in one form. Results were analyzed in terms of the Yes/No, 
Yes/Yes and No/No versions of the possible fallacy. However it should be noted that since 
we deliberately chose statements that had high credibility to start with (e.g. all ravens are 
black, all sofas have backrests), the number of No/No fallacies was expected to be fairly 
low, since they required that people disbelieve these statements. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-one undergraduates at City University, London volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. A small number of participants in the experiments reported 
here were not native speakers of English, but self-reported their level of English as 
competent or fluent bilingual. No participant took part in more than one of the experiments 
reported. 
Procedure. Each participant was given one of two booklets with instructions and 36 
sentences. The words “Yes / No” and the numbers 1 through 10 appeared to the right of 
each sentence. Participants circled the word yes or no for each sentence to indicate if it was 
true or not. They then indicated their confidence by circling a number between 1 (= very 
unconfident) and 10 (= very confident). The booklet took about 10 minutes to complete.  
Materials. The 36 sentences in each booklet consisted of 28 target and 8 filler sentences. 
Order of sentences (in their alternate forms) was the same in both booklets. Target 
sentences occurred in one of two versions, differing only in whether the subject noun (e.g. 
sofa) was modified or not. Unmodified sentences N were simple explicitly universally 
quantified sentences (All sofas have backrests). Modified sentences MN contained two 
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modifiers prefixed to the head noun (All uncomfortable handmade sofas have backrests). 
Modifiers were chosen to be atypical of the head noun class (they did not occur in property 
norms, Cree and McRae, 2003), yet still consistent with both head noun and predicate. 
Predicates were chosen so that the resulting N sentence should be plausibly true. Many of 
the sentences were taken with permission directly from Connolly et al.’s (2003) materials 
since they provided a good fit with the above restrictions. Fillers were either analytically 
true (All triangles have three corners) or highly plausible (All large explosions are 
dangerous) in order to encourage full use of the confidence scale.  
Design. The sentence pairs were divided into two sets. Set A were in unmodified form 
in booklet 1, and modified form in booklet 2, while Set B were the other way round. In this 
way each participant saw just one version of each target sentence, and the two versions of 
each sentence were rated by different groups of participants. Each participant judged 14 
modified and 14 unmodified sentences. Four filler sentences were included at the start to 
avoid warm-up effects and 4 more filler sentences were distributed among the target 
sentences in the same position in each booklet. Filler sentences were generally given high 
confidence “yes” responses as expected. 
Results 
A Yes/No inverse conjunction fallacy would be seen if participants gave more yes 
responses to the unmodified than to the modified sentences. Where participants gave no 
response (25 data points, or 4%), the data were treated as missing. Overall, unmodified 
sentences received 21% more yes responses (M = .72, SD = .21) than did modified 
sentences (M = .51, SD = .26). Analyses of variance (ANOVA) by subjects (F1) and by 
items (F2) were run with proportion of “yes” responses as dependent variable, and with 
booklet and sentence type as factors. Only the main effect of sentence type was significant 
(F1(1,19) = 17.7, F2(1,26) = 43.3, Min F’ (1,33) = 12.6, p = .001). Overall, the effect was 
seen in 17 of 21 participants, and in 23 of 28 sentence pairs.  
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Confidence data were analyzed separately for yes and for no responses. Mean 
confidence in a yes for N sentences (M = 7.8, SD = 1.2) was significantly greater than that 
for MN sentences (M = 6.3, SD = 2.1, F1(1, 18) = 17.2, F2(1, 27) = 20.25, Min F’(1, 41) = 
9.3, p < .005). For “no” responses there was no significant difference between confidence 
for N sentences (M = 6.5, SD = 1.6) and for MN sentences (M = 5.8, SD = 1.9). There was 
therefore evidence for the Yes/Yes form, but not for the No/No form of the fallacy. 
In sum, nearly three quarters of unmodified sentences but only half the modified 
sentences were endorsed as universally true, and further, where both sentences were 
endorsed as true, greater confidence was expressed in the unmodified sentences. These two 
results indicate a strong tendency for participants to commit the inverse conjunction fallacy. 
In order to see whether people would continue to make fallacious responses when faced 
with both versions of the same sentence, Experiment 2 employed a within-subjects 
manipulation of sentences. It is arguable for example that once having judged that “All MN 
are P” is false, people would then show reluctance to agree that “All N are P” is true. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-three students at City University, London volunteered to 
participate. 
Materials and Procedure. Exactly the same 36 sentences were used as in Experiment 1, 
and the same procedure was followed. 
Design. In Experiment 2 the two sets of sentence pairs from Experiment 1 were used to 
create two different booklets as replications of a within-subjects design. We decided to keep 
the length of the booklets the same between experiments, so that there would be no increase 
in the amount of attention required. Each booklet therefore consisted of a set of just 14 
target sentence pairs plus the same 8 fillers as before. The first half of the booklet contained 
7 target sentences in their unmodified versions and 7 in modified versions, while the second 
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half contained the alternate versions of the same 14 sentences. In this way participants 
judged both versions of each target sentence in the same booklet, with an average distance 
between the two of 18 sentences. 
Results 
Two of the participants failed to provide scores for half or more of the items and were 
excluded from the study. There were 10 participants left for one booklet and 11 for the 
other. In addition 16 pairs of responses (5%) were treated as missing because participants 
did not respond to one or other sentence. The first key result of interest was the frequency 
with which participants said yes to the unmodified version of a sentence and no to the 
modified version (the Yes/No fallacy). Seventeen of the 21 participants made 2 or more 
responses of this kind to the 14 sentence pairs that they saw. In addition, 24 of the 28 
sentence pairs had at least 1 Yes/No response, and 17 pairs had 2 or more from the 10 to 11 
participants rating them. Table 1 shows the breakdown of all 278 response pairs according 
to whether the N and MN versions of a sentence pair were given yes or no responses. Of the 
210 occasions where the N version of a sentence was judged true, 56 (27%) had the MN 
version judged false. If participants had respected the logic of class inclusion, then there 
would have been no Yes/No responses at all in Table 1. The finding of 56 Yes/No 
responses was therefore remarkable. To test that the results were not owing to random 
responding due to lack of attention, the rate of Yes/No responding (20%) was compared to 
that of No/Yes responding (8%).  The difference was significant (F1(1,20) = 15.2, F2(1,27) 
= 15.2, Min F’(1,46) = 7.6, p < .01).  As in Experiment 1, the overall proportion of yes 
responses was significantly greater for the N (.76) than for the MN sentences (.63), a 
difference of 13%.   
Yes/Yes and No/No responses were also analyzed for an inverse conjunction fallacy 
based on confidence. Recall that comparing N to MN sentences, it is inconsistent to have 
greater confidence in a Yes or to have lower confidence in a No for the N version of a 
Jönsson & Hampton  The Inverse Conjunction Fallacy   14 
sentence pair. For the 154 Yes/Yes response combinations, 97 were rated with more 
confidence in the unmodified N form and only 25 with more confidence in the modified 
MN form. Of participants, 19 showed this effect, and only 1 showed the opposite effect 
while for items, 24 showed the effect and only 4 showed the opposite (F1(1,20) = 36.0, 
F2(1, 27) = 30.2, Min F’(1,47) = 16.4, p < .001). For the 47 No/No response combinations, 
there was little evidence of fallacious responding, since 24 of the responses involved 
rejecting the unmodified form with more confidence than the modified form, and only 7 
showed the reverse effect that we identified as indicating a fallacy. In fact, for both Yes/Yes 
and No/No response combinations, there tended to be more confidence expressed for the 
unmodified sentences, regardless of whether they were accepted or rejected. 
Summing together all three forms of the fallacy, participants produced an inverse 
conjunction fallacy of one sort or another on just over half (56%) of the sentence pairs they 
considered. Surprisingly, the order in which the modified and unmodified version of each 
sentence was presented had no significant effect on a participant’s tendency to give a 
fallacious response. In fact, participants tended to give slightly more Yes/No responses 
when the modified version was presented first (23%) than the other way around (17%). 
Contrary to expectation, having decided that not all uncomfortable handmade sofas have 
backrests, people continued to agree that all sofas do have backrests. Comparing the rate of 
“yes” responses with Experiment 1, it was clear that while agreement with the N sentences 
was about the same (.72 vs. .76) agreement with the MN sentences increased from 
Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 (.51 vs. .63). So if the repeated judgments in Experiment 2 
had any effect it was towards increasing acceptance of MN sentences rather than reducing 
agreement with N.  However ANOVA with experiment and sentence type as factors 
showed no significant interaction effect (F1(1,40) = 2.20, p = .14, F2(1,27) = 3.89, p < .06), 
and the change in agreement with MN across experiments was significant across items but 
not across subjects.2   
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The fallacy we have observed is only a fallacy if our participants accepted that the MN 
class was a subset of the N class – for example that all uncomfortable handmade sofas are 
sofas.  The reader is invited to consult the Appendix, where it may be confirmed that it is 
implausible to suppose for example that dirty German lambs are not lambs, or that thin 
polyester shirts are not shirts. Sofas do not cease to be sofas when they are uncomfortable 
and handmade. Nonetheless, concepts denoted by modified noun phrases are not always 
members of the unmodified noun class.  First there is the well-known case of privative 
expressions like “fake dollars” which are not dollars. Furthermore, Hampton (1982, 
Experiment 1) showed that people did not treat phrases like school furniture or office 
furniture as proper subsets of furniture, but accepted that some office furniture is not 
furniture. There are also biological concepts where older folk nomenclature is at odds with 
scientific knowledge, thus leading to anomalous naming (for example the silk oak, the tan-
oak and the poison oak are none of them true oaks, although they may have acorns). In 
Experiment 3 we therefore set out to test the presumption that in the case of our materials 
people do see the modified noun phrase as referring to a subset of the unmodified noun. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-one undergraduates at City University, London participated in 
the experiment in exchange for course credit. 
 Procedure. Each participant was given a booklet with instructions and 66 sentences. 
The words “yes/no” appeared to the right of each sentence. Participants circled the word 
yes or no for each sentence to indicate if it was true or not. The booklet took about 10 
minutes to complete. 
Materials. The 66 sentences in each booklet consisted of 28 target and 38 filler 
sentences. All sentences were of the form “All MN’s are N’s”. The target sentences (e.g. 
“All uncomfortable handmade sofas are sofas”) were generated from the target sentences 
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used in Experiments 1 and 2. Ten of the filler sentences were intended to be true based on 
ordinary modifier noun combinations with typical modifiers (All crunchy red apples are 
apples, All long curly hair is hair). These fillers were later used as catch trials in order to 
identify participants who might have become over-cautious, being unwilling to affirm even 
clearly analytical statements, or who were responding erratically for some other reason. 
These fillers also provided clear examples of “yes” responses, so that participants would not 
feel it necessary to say yes to any of our target sentences. The remaining 28 filler sentences 
were intended to be false and used privative adjectives as modifiers. Privatives belong to a 
class of modifier that explicitly contradicts the set relation that we were interested in 
confirming.  For example counterfeit dollars are not dollars, and imitation leather is not 
leather.  By including these two kinds of fillers in the list, we provided participants with 
clear examples for yes and no responses so that they would be less influenced by the 
demand characteristics of the list of target sentences (which we predicted would be all true).  
Design. Ten of the filler sentences were included at the start of the booklet in order 
to avoid warm-up effects. The rest of the fillers were randomly distributed among the target 
sentences. The target sentences appeared in random order. 
Results and Discussion 
Taking the data of all 21 participants, the mean percentage of yes responses to the 
target subset sentences was 90%, to the true filler sentences 94% and to the false privative 
fillers 23%.  All the true filler sentences had at least 19 out of 21 yes responses.  Taking this 
level of agreement as a criterion of full acceptance, 22 of the 28 target sentences were 
clearly judged to be true.  Of the 6 target sentences with less good agreement, the two worst 
were “All futuristic fruit wagons are wagons” and “All Appalachian stake-out shacks are 
shacks”, which each received only 12 out of 21 yes responses.  On examination, it turned 
out that all of the “no” responses given to the true fillers came from just 5 of the 21 
participants.  It is therefore quite possible that these 5 participants were either being too 
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cautious, or were inattentive to the task.  If the responses of these 5 participants were 
omitted, then 94% of responses to target sentences were yes, 17 of the target sentences had 
100% yes responses, and just 4 had more than 2 no responses.  At the same time the false 
privative fillers rate of yes responses actually decreased from 23% to 20%, indicating that 
the 5 excluded participants were not just biased towards saying no, but were also generally 
responding in an idiosyncratic fashion. 
In conclusion, the great majority of our target sentences were endorsed as true.  The 
6 sentences with a lower acceptance rate were noted, and account was taken of them in the 
analyses of experiments to be reported below. Although it would have been better to 
replace these items for subsequent experiments, the results of Experiment 3 were not 
available in time to enable us to do this.  We therefore resorted to a post-hoc check to 
confirm that later results were not owing to these 6 items. 
Looking back at the results of Experiments 1 and 2, there was no significant 
correlation across target sentences between the number of participants answering yes to a 
subset relation in Experiment 3 and the degree to which the sentence showed the Yes/No 
fallacy in those experiments (r(26) =  -0.01 and 0.11 respectively). Excluding the 6 items in 
question left the size and significance of the modifier effects in Experiment 1 and 2 
unaffected. For Experiment 1 the mean probability of yes responses was .72 for N sentences 
and .53 for MN (compared to .72 and .51 before exclusion). For Experiment 2 the 
probabilities were unchanged at .76 for N and .63 for MN sentences. We thus conclude that 
our assumption was correct and the effect does not stem from the fact that participants did 
not believe that the MN were a subclass of the N. 
Experiment 4 
An alternative explanation for the fallacy to which we turned next is that people 
may not interpret the word “All” as mapping onto the universal quantifier in logic.  We may 
frequently use sentences starting with “All” in common parlance as indicating a strongly 
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generic rather than a strictly universal quantification.  Experiment 4 set out to manipulate 
the verbal form of the quantifier in order to explore this possibility.   
Our first variation was to add the word “always”, as in “All sofas always have 
backrests”). According to an account of the results suggested by Johannes Persson 
(personal communication, January, 2006), the target sentences may be interpreted as 
containing not one, but two quantifiers.  One refers to variation within the class of objects 
(i.e. every object) and the other refers to variations in an object over time.  The unmodified 
sentences may be interpreted just in terms of the object class, whereas the modified 
sentences may be interpreted also in terms of the implicit temporal quantifier.  For example 
“All uncomfortable handmade sofas have backrests” might be understood as “All sofas 
have backrests when they are uncomfortable and handmade”.  If the modifier introduces a 
second temporal dimension over which quantification has to apply, and which is not 
considered for the unmodified sentence, then the Yes/No response is no longer inconsistent.  
Adding the word “always” should counteract this possibility.  In addition to this possible 
account, the addition of “always” could be seen as simply serving to strengthen the 
universal nature of the quantifier. 
The other two variations on the quantifier were directed at encouraging participants 
to attend to the set inclusion relation by using explicitly extensional terms.  In one condition 
“All” was replaced by “Every single”, which was intended to draw attention to individual 
objects in the extension.  In the other condition we used the quantifier “100%”, following 
Gigerenzer’s finding that fallacies in probabilistic reasoning can be reduced when 
frequencies are used in place of likelihoods (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, for a review see 
Lagnado & Sloman, 2004). 
We predicted that if the fallacy is at least in part to be explained by vagueness in the 
meaning of the word “All” in common language, then one or more of our variations would 
lead to a significant reduction in, or even elimination of the fallacy. 
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Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-nine undergraduates at City University, London participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit. 
Design and Materials. Participants were allocated randomly to one of 4 conditions. The 
All condition was a replication of Experiment 1 and used exactly the same sentences. The 
three remaining conditions differed only in terms of the quantifiers used, giving the All-
Always, the Every-Single and the 100% conditions.  Each condition involved a pair of 
booklets constructed in the same way as for Experiment 1, but with the appropriate change 
in quantifier.  Within each booklet, half the target sentences were modified and half 
unmodified.  As a small improvement on the design, the original 8 true fillers used in 
Experiment 1 were replaced with 12 fillers half of which were expected to be true and half 
false (see Appendix). In addition, to mirror the target sentences, half the fillers had 
modified subject nouns and half unmodified.  Ten copies of each of the 8 booklets were 
distributed at random to participants who completed them in class or individually.  Between 
7 and 10 participants completed and returned each booklet, giving between 15 and 19 
participants per condition. 
Results 
 Individual means for proportion of yes responses given to modified and unmodified 
sentences in each condition are shown in the top panel of Figure 1, together with 95% 
confidence intervals.  Overall, the modified sentences were judged true 60% of the time, 
while the unmodified sentences were judged true 72% of the time.  To test for the Yes/No 
fallacy, a 2-way ANOVA was run with quantifier type (4 levels between subjects and 
within items) and sentence type (modified vs unmodified, within subjects and within items) 
as factors. Only the main effect of sentence type was significant on both analyses (F1(1,65) 
= 26.3, F2(1,27) = 13.673, Min F’(1,56) = 9.0, p < .005). The effect of quantifier type was 
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significant across items (F2(3,81) = 4.2, p < .01) but not across subjects (F1<1).  There was 
no significant interaction (F1 and F2 <1).  Planned contrasts for each quantifier condition 
between modified and unmodified sentences were significant by items for all conditions, 
and by subjects for all except for the All-always condition (p = .09).  Min F’ statistics were 
also calculated for this contrast in each condition, and Min F’ was only significant for the 
Every Single condition (Min F’(1,42) = 4.87. p < .05). Averaged across conditions the 
fallacy effect was seen in 78% of all items and in 66% of all participants. 
Following the finding in Experiment 3 that a small set of 6 sentence pairs may not 
always be interpreted as having a subset relation, the analysis was re-run with these pairs 
excluded.  The main effect of sentence type was still significant (F1(1,65) = 18.2, F2(1,21) 
= 7.7, Min F’ (1,40) = 5.41, p < .05), and the effect still occurred in 17/22 items (77%).   
Mean confidence ratings data were calculated separately for yes and for no responses in 
order to examine the Yes/Yes and No/No versions of the fallacy. The lower panel in Figure 
1 shows mean confidence for yes and no responses for the four conditions. Error bars show 
95% confidence intervals.   
Mean confidence across conditions for yes responses was 8.3 on a 10 point scale for 
unmodified N sentences, and 6.8 for modified MN sentences, a difference of 1.5, 
confirming the Yes/Yes fallacy.  A 2-way ANOVA of the confidence given to yes 
responses confirmed a significant effect of modifier (F1(1, 64) = 67.9, F2(1, 26) = 54.6, 
Min F’ (1, 67) = 30.2, p < .001).  The effect of quantifier condition was significant only by 
items, and not by subjects (p = .056).  A post hoc comparison of confidence across 
conditions showed that the All condition had greater confidence ratings than either Every 
Single or 100% (p < .05 on both subjects and items analyses).  Strengthening the quantifier 
thus seems to have reduced confidence, but not the likelihood of saying yes.  Finally, the 
modifier effect on confidence was analyzed for each condition separately.  The contrast was 
significant on a Min F’ analysis for all conditions (p < .005), except for the All condition, 
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where Min F’ was marginal (Min F’ (1,40) = 3.67, p = .06).  
For no responses, mean confidence was 6.8 for N and 5.8 for MN sentences.  Since this 
difference was in the direction that is consistent with logical reasoning, there was no 
evidence for the No/No version of the fallacy. 
As before, the results indicated a strong tendency for participants to commit the inverse 
conjunction fallacy. Further, since no interaction between type of sentence and type of 
quantifier was found, this tendency cannot be attributed to some peculiarity of the meaning 
of ‘all’.  More specifically, the data rules out an explanation in terms of an implicit 
temporal quantifier since the “All Always” condition didn’t deviate significantly from the 
other quantifiers.  There was some observed difference in the size of the effect across 
conditions (see Figure 2), with All and Every Single generating a 0.15 drop in agreement 
between unmodified and modified sentences, and All-Always and 100% generating a 0.10 
drop.  Our design was however clearly not powerful enough to detect a significant 
interaction of this size, so it is safer to conclude for the present that the Inverse Conjunction 
Fallacy is not strongly affected by different means of expressing universal quantification.  
Whatever difficulties there may be in people interpreting “All” as really meaning all seem 
to apply also to the other forms of quantifier.  Both the likelihood of saying yes, and the 
confidence with which a yes response was given showed a preference for unmodified forms 
of the sentences. 
Since the effect appears to be so robust, our final two experiments were directed at 
testing the boundary conditions of the effect further.  Changing the quantifier in a between-
subjects design had little detectable effect.  But what if the within-subjects design of 
Experiment 2 were adapted so that the relation between the two sentences of a pair became 
more obvious?  Would participants then resort to more logical extensional reasoning and 
avoid making the fallacy?  Experiment 2 presented each participant with the modified and 
the unmodified version of each sentence, with a gap of about 18 sentences in between.  In 
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Experiments 5 and 6 we presented the two versions of each sentence next to each other.  In 
the first of these experiments, participants were asked to judge whether one sentence or the 
other was more likely to be true, or whether they were equally true.  In the second 
(Experiment 6), the participants simply saw each version of a sentence one above the other 
as a pair, and judged whether each was true in turn. 
An explicit comparison between the likelihood of the two sentences, or judging them as 
a pair, should highlight the purely formal relationship between the two sentences and the 
subset relation that it signifies. Hence, we predicted less occurrence of fallacious 
responding in these two experiments.  
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates at City University, London participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Each participant was given one of two booklets with instructions and 50 
sentence-pairs. The options “A is more likely”, “Equally Likely” and “B is more likely” 
appeared to the right of each sentence-pair. The first sentence of each sentence pair was 
labeled “A”, the second sentence was labeled “B”. Participants circled the option that they 
thought was the most appropriate for each sentence pair. The booklet took about 10 minutes 
to complete.  
Materials. The 50 sentence pairs in each booklet consisted of 28 target and 22 filler 
pairs. The order of the pairs was the same in both booklets, and the sentences that made up 
each sentence pair was also the same for both booklets. Each target pair contained the two 
versions of one of the sentences that had been used in Experiment 1 (e.g. ‘All lambs are 
friendly” together with “All dirty German lambs are friendly”). The filler pairs had the 
same form as the target pairs, with one modified and one unmodified sentence. Half of the 
filler-pairs used privatives as in Experiment 3 so that the unmodified sentence was 
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intuitively more plausible than the modified one (“All guns are dangerous” and “All plastic 
replica guns are dangerous”) and half used knowledge-based effects relating the modifier to 
the predicate to make the modified sentence intuitively more plausible (“All bags are 
flammable” and “All dry paper bags are flammable”). We took care to make the more likely 
filler statements more or less analytic in order for the universal quantification to be 
appropriate.  
Design. Order of the sentences within each pair in the first booklet was reversed in the 
second booklet. Eight filler sentence-pairs were included at the start to avoid warm-up 
effects. The rest of the filler pairs were distributed randomly among the target pairs.  
Results 
Combining the results across the two booklets, the filler items were judged as predicted, 
with 75% of responses favoring the predicted member of each pair.  For target sentences, 
participants judged the unmodified statement as the most likely about half the time (46%), 
they judged the two sentences as equally likely half the time (50%), and they very rarely 
judged the modified statement as the more likely (4% of the answers). There was only one 
item (saxophones) where the modified statement was judged more likely overall than the 
unmodified one.  Proportions of responses were unaffected if the 6 pairs with weaker subset 
relations from Experiment 3 were excluded.  The response distribution across participants 
showed strong individual variation. Roughly half the participants used a majority of 
“Equally likely” responses, and the other half mostly preferred to say the unmodified 
sentence was more likely.  Proportion of “Equally likely” responses varied across 
participants from 7% to 93% of responses. No participants succeeded in completely 
avoiding any judgments in favor of the unmodified sentence, even when the 6 weaker 
subset pairs were ignored. 
So despite the close comparison required of the two versions of each sentence, the 
inverse conjunction fallacy was again frequently observed. The “best” 2 participants judged 
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the sentences equally likely on over 80% of pairs, but the large majority was just as happy 
to judge the unmodified sentence as more likely than the modified. 
For the final experiment, we made another attempt to find conditions in which the 
subset relation would become obvious to our participants, and so discourage them from 
giving the fallacious response.  In Experiment 5, a judgment that the unmodified sentence 
was more likely to be true could be consistent with the belief that both sentences were false.  
Although we have argued above that it is still logically inconsistent to think that it is more 
likely that the modified sentence is false than that the unmodified sentence is false, it is 
possible that asking for comparative judgments of possibly false sentences weakens the 
interpretation that would be placed on the quantifier “All”.  The discovery that two of the 
filler sentences occurring early in the booklet were also clearly false, as opposed to just 
unlikely to some degree, (“All birds fly” and “All stones are used for construction”) 
increased our concern that we were not directly measuring the belief that the unmodified 
sentence was true, while the modified sentence was false.  Experiment 6 therefore used a 
different procedure. We still placed the two versions of each sentence next to each other, 
but we didn’t require a choice between them. Instead, we asked, for each version of the 
sentence whether it was true or false. This way of probing beliefs (in terms of yes/no) 
should make the logical characteristics of the situation yet more salient. We also took the 
opportunity to replace the two filler pairs that we considered to be false (see Appendix).  
Experiment 6 
Method 
Participants. Twenty undergraduates at City University, London participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Each participant was given one of two booklets with instructions and 50 
pairs of sentences. The options “True” and “False” appeared to the right of each sentence. 
Participants circled the option that they thought was the most appropriate for each sentence. 
Jönsson & Hampton  The Inverse Conjunction Fallacy   25 
The booklet took about 15 minutes to complete.  
Materials. The 50 sentence pairs in each booklet consisted of the same 28 target and 22 
filler pairs as in Experiment 5 (with the exception of the replacement of 2 fillers).  
Design. Four filler sentence-pairs were included at the start to avoid warm-up effects 
and the rest were distributed randomly among the target pairs. Order within each pair was 
reversed across the two booklets. 
Results 
Three responses (0.6%) were missing and were excluded from the analysis. One 
participant was excluded because she always gave different responses to the two sentences 
of each pair, and so was judged to have misunderstood the task.  For the remaining 19 
participants, the frequency of response pairs to unmodified and modified sentences for each 
pair is shown in Table 2.  Only 12% of response pairs were of the type we have labeled a 
fallacy, saying yes to All N are P and no to All MN are P.  That corresponded to 17% of 
sentence pairs where the N sentence was considered true. This rate of responding was still 
significantly above that of giving the reverse response combination No/Yes (4%), so we 
consider that the Yes/No responses were not just random errors in selecting a yes or no 
response (F1(1,18) = 13.0, F2(1,27) = 9.1, Min F’(1,45) = 5.35, p < .05).  The rate of 
making the fallacy was reduced further however if the 6 items with weaker subset relations 
from Experiment 3 were excluded.  Rate of Yes/No responses fell to 9% which was no 
longer significantly more than the 4% rate of No/Yes on the more conservative Min F’ test 
(F1(1,18) = 5.2, p < .05, F2(1,21) = 3.7, p = .07, Min F’(1,38) = 2.16, p = .15).  Analysis of 
order of sentences showed absolutely no difference between pairs where the modified or the 
unmodified sentence was listed first. 
The aim of Experiments 5 and 6 was to test the boundary conditions of our 
phenomenon.  If placing two sentences side-by-side has the effect of drawing attention to 
the logical relation between them, and hence encouraging logical extensional reasoning, 
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then we predicted that fallacious responding should decrease.  The present experiment, 
unlike Experiment 5, succeeded in greatly lowering the rate of Yes/No judgments.  
Participants judged the sentences either to be both true or to be both false 84% of the time, 
compared with only 50% judging them equally likely in Experiment 5.  Even so, there was 
only 1 participant who gave zero fallacious responses – even when the 6 sentence pairs with 
weaker subset relations were excluded. 
General discussion 
Overall, our experiments have demonstrated that people have a strong tendency to 
accept unmodified universally quantified sentences with greater frequency and/or greater 
confidence than the equivalent modified versions. The analysis of confidence ratings 
suggested that confidence was also generally higher for unmodified sentences – either for 
accepting them or for rejecting them. In the case of acceptance, this led to a logical 
inconsistency, and in the case of rejection it did not. 
The inverse conjunction fallacy is closely related to phenomena found in category-based 
induction studies reported and discussed by Osherson et al. (1990) and Sloman (1993, 
1998), and described in the introduction. It is therefore instructive to draw parallels between 
them before considering possible explanations of the inverse conjunction fallacy itself. 
Induction fallacies and the inverse conjunction fallacy 
The induction phenomena relate to how the similarity between premise and conclusion 
categories influences the perceived argument strength for (logically) perfectly strong 
arguments. Osherson et al.’s (1990) inclusion fallacy for example (that an argument from 
Robins to Birds is stronger than an argument from Robins to Ostriches) arises because the 
step from Birds to Ostriches is not taken as being perfectly strong. If it were, then the 
argument from Robins to Birds to Ostriches would be as strong as that from Robins to 
Birds. That it is not perceived to be perfectly strong indicates a failure to generalize from all 
birds to all subsets of birds. (Hampton and Cannon, 2004, demonstrated that inductive 
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arguments from one category member to another were seen as stronger the more typical the 
conclusion item). 
In the inclusion similarity phenomenon (Sloman, 1993, 1998) arguments from a 
superordinate category to a subclass are seen as stronger if the particular subclass is more 
typical of the category, while in the premise specificity phenomenon the same arguments 
are seen as stronger if the general category is more specific. In each case two arguments 
that are perfectly strong are treated as being of different strength when the premise-
conclusion similarity differs between them. So once again, facts that are stipulated to be 
true of all members of a category are not generalized reliably to all members of subsets of 
that category. 
These three induction phenomena may well rely on the same mechanisms as the inverse 
conjunction fallacy to the extent that, like the inverse conjunction fallacy, they involve a 
failure to accept the logical entailment of class inclusion – that if a general class has a 
property, then all subclasses, no matter how atypical or how distant taxonomically, must 
also have the property. There are also some important differences between the 
demonstration of the inverse conjunction fallacy and the induction effects that suggest that 
the former may reflect a more fundamental process.  
First, whereas the induction effects require participants to accept the truth of a blank 
premise and then judge the likelihood of the conclusion, the inverse conjunction fallacy 
leaves participants free to accept or deny either of the two sentences. People are therefore 
shown to entertain beliefs deviating from logical norms in a wider context than just within 
the context of an explicit argument involving possibly counterfactual suppositions. (López,  
Atran, Coley, Medin, and Smith, 1997, reported that category-based inductive arguments 
may be rejected because respondents are unwilling to accept the truth of the premise).  
Second, the induction phenomena use blank predicates whereas the inverse conjunction 
fallacy uses predicates familiar to the participants. Hence, the inconsistency illustrated by 
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the inverse conjunction fallacy may be considered more fundamental, since no conditional 
or hypothetical reasoning is involved. Third, the fact that the same head noun (e.g. sofa or 
raven) is seen in each sentence pair, renders the inclusion relation between the sentences 
much more explicit in the inverse conjunction fallacy, than when terms from a taxonomy 
are used as in Sloman’s examples (e.g. plant versus moss). In fact Sloman (1998, Expt 4) 
found that if the inclusion relation is explicitly added to the arguments in his induction task, 
the effects disappear.  
In spite of these differences between Sloman’s phenomena and ours, we consider that 
his explanation of why people treat logically equivalent arguments differently is 
substantially correct. It seems plausible that the explanation for all of these phenomena 
should be in terms of intensional reasoning using abstract representations of the relevant 
categories, with consequent neglect of the set relations holding between category members. 
We turn now to considering different accounts of the results in more detail. 
Explaining the inverse conjunction fallacy 
Similarity-based accounts. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) suggested that people break 
the conjunction rule because they use a “representativeness” heuristic. People judge how 
representative the individual would be of the simple or conjunctive categories. So our 
unimaginative friend Bill would be more representative of an accountant who plays jazz for 
a hobby than of just anyone who plays jazz for a hobby. Rather than considering the 
problem extensionally in terms of inclusion relations among the sets involved, people solve 
it intensionally, in terms of the similarity of the concepts.  
Accounts of the three induction effects described above also rely on intensional 
reasoning – the computation of similarity between premise and conclusion categories. It 
seems very plausible therefore to adopt a similar approach to explaining the inverse 
conjunction fallacy. People clearly ignore extensional considerations when they make the 
fallacy, and the fact that the effect involves the use of atypical modifiers is also indicative 
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that similarity is at issue. (Connolly et al., 2003, showed that the reduction in likelihood of 
unquantified MN sentences compared to N sentences was greater if the modifier was 
atypical, a result confirmed by Jönsson & Hampton, 2005). A similarity-based model of 
conceptual combination such as Hampton’s (1987) composite prototype model should 
therefore provide a useful framework for understanding the result. Taking the modified 
noun phrase MN as a conceptual combination, then the model suggests that it will inherit 
the attributes of each concept in approximately equal measure (subject to the resolution of 
possible conflicts and the incorporation of possible knowledge of particulars – see Rips, 
1995). We would therefore expect attributes of the head noun to be incorporated into the 
conceptual combination but with reduced weight (since they are only true of one half of the 
concept pair). Our first account is therefore straightforwardly that people (at times 
erroneously) evaluate the truth of universally quantified statements, not by considering 
whether any counterexamples may exist, but rather by considering the weight or centrality 
of an attribute as part of the concept representation. Attributes tend to have reduced 
centrality in modified concepts, and so people are less likely to agree to their universal 
truth. 
Restricted counterexample search accounts. An alternative account makes use of a 
notion central to mental models theory, that we evaluate the truth of a statement via the 
search for a model in which the statement may be false (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Unless a 
statement is analytically true (as is 2 + 3 = 5), then universally quantified truth must involve 
the contingent absence of counterexamples. That is to say for example that “All ravens are 
black” is true simply because of the non-existence of any non-black ravens. From this 
perspective, an explanation should therefore address why people might fail to find 
counterexamples to the unmodified N statements, but find counterexamples for the MN 
statements. We consider three possibilities. 
The first possibility is that the modifier focuses the attention on some circumstance that 
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is not available when evaluating the statement in its unmodified form. Thus the effective 
search space for N statements may be much smaller than that for MN statements. If asked if 
all coins are made of metal, this question may be taken implicitly to refer to types of coins 
currently in circulation as legal currency. At a pinch it might include recent but now 
obsolete examples such as French francs or German marks. The possibility that old 
Egyptian coins may have been made from some other form of precious mineral, or that 
there may be a tribe in the Himalaya that use coins carved from the tusks of ibex may then 
be overlooked. It is not until the modified statement is encountered that the possibility of a 
broader notion of the unmodified concept class – of a more widely defined set of category 
members – comes to mind. The roots of this behavior may lie in the vagueness of our 
concepts (Keefe & Smith, 1997). If we are unclear (as we often are) just what should count 
as a sofa or a shack, then such terms can be taken with a broader or a narrower sense. It 
would then be logically consistent to agree to the N statement (in a narrower sense it is true 
that all ravens are black) but to disagree with MN (in a broader sense of “raven” the class 
may include foreign species of unknown color).  Somewhat paradoxically then, 
consideration of a narrower class (jungle ravens are more specific than ravens) may lead to 
a widening of the category of relevant exemplars to be considered. 
A second possibility is that the modifier provides a retrieval cue for knowledge-based 
reasoning that may serve to undermine the truth of the statement. This possibility may 
occur even if there is no direct contradiction of the predicate implied in the modifier (i.e. we 
rule out privative cases like “All broken clocks tell the time” or “All dead pigeons can fly”). 
For example, for the statement “All young jungle ravens are black”, each modifier yields an 
additional consideration that might be helpful in finding counterexamples. From “jungle” a 
person may reason from knowledge of biological theory thus: “Coloration often serves as 
camouflage. Ravens living in jungles may therefore have evolved to be some other color. 
Color change is also plausible since color is an attribute that can change easily without 
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entailing deep changes in other attributes,” (see Johnson & Keil, 2000). Or from “young” 
they might reason based on analogy with remembered examples: “Swans change color as 
they grow older, so young ravens may do also”. In other words, the modifiers may spark off 
either theory-based or experience-based reasoning that would not normally be used when 
evaluating the N sentence. 
The third possibility is that the MN concepts engage modal rather than existential 
interpretations of the sentences (Rips, 2001). A modal interpretation directs the search for 
counterexamples beyond the universe of existing objects and into the realm of what may be 
possible. Consider again “All uncomfortable handmade sofas have back rests”. All sofas we 
have ever seen have back rests, but if a sofa is handmade, it would be possible for someone 
to make it differently, and if it had no back rest it would be likely to be uncomfortable. The 
modifier may switch the search for counterexamples from actual to possible cases. 
All of these accounts suggest that the modifier provides access to a wider range of 
possible counterexamples. A problem with these accounts is that if someone is aiming for 
logical consistency then after expansion to a wider context, or after a deeper consideration 
of possibilities, it is strange that they would not then keep in mind the same 
counterexamples when subsequently accepting N sentences. We would have expected a 
much reduced inverse conjunction fallacy in Experiment 2 for those sentence pairs where 
the MN was judged first, and the N second, but we found no evidence for this. Similarly, if 
one of these accounts is correct the inverse conjunction effect should disappear in a forced 
choice setting such as that in Experiment 5.  Processing the two sentences together in order 
to compare them should make available the same search space and the same possible 
counterexamples. Yet nearly half the time, participants still rated the unmodified sentence 
more likely than the modified sentence.  
A fall-back position might be to appeal to some pragmatic consideration – that when 
evaluating the N sentences in Experiment 2, the participants reverted to the default context 
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because the narrower category context was more pragmatically appropriate. For example it 
could be argued that having said that not all old Egyptian coins are made of metal, one 
could then reasonably say that it is still true that all coins (i.e. all normal everyday coins) 
are. One may be implicitly contrasting the atypical subset with the rest of the category in 
this case. But again, it seems implausible to think that in the forced choice setting of 
Experiment 5, where the two sentences are interpreted together in order to come to a 
decision on which is more likely, the counterexamples found for one of the sentences 
should be ignored when assessing the other.   
Another reason for doubting the generality of the counterexample search accounts is 
that they do not explain the range of phenomena found in category-based induction. If you 
are told that all birds have ulnars, then you have no good reason to feel it more likely that 
robins do than that ostriches do. The use of blank predicates in these tasks takes away the 
responsibility for judging the truth of the unmodified sentences from the participant, so that 
the question of failing to notice counterexamples does not arise.  If a single explanation is 
to be found to cover both induction effects and the inverse conjunction fallacy, then the 
intensional reasoning account is to be preferred. 
Existential quantifiers and Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. A third competing 
explanation goes as follows. A statement like “All jungle ravens are black” conveys the 
presupposition that there are such things as jungle ravens. This presupposition might be 
treated as something independent of the truth conditions of the statement, but it might also 
be treated as part of these truth conditions. Bertrand Russell provided a solution for the 
problem of reference to non-existents (referential failure) in sentences such as “The present 
king of France is bald” with his theory of definite descriptions (Russell, 1905, 1919). He 
proposed that the interpretation of such a sentence entailed the conjunction of three 
propositions –  
(9) There exists at least one thing x such that x is the King of France 
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(10) There exists at most one thing x such that x is the King of France 
(11) x is bald 
Given that (9) is false, then the conjunction of (9), (10) and (11) is false, and there is no 
need to evaluate (11). In a similar vein, “All jungle ravens are black” might be interpreted 
as “There exist things that are jungle ravens, and all such things are black”. Certainly then, 
if one had doubts about whether there are any such things as jungle ravens, one’s 
confidence in the conjunctive statement will be low. It would therefore be consistent to 
deny that “All jungle ravens are black” while affirming that “All ravens are black” if the 
denial was based on believing that jungle ravens do not exist. This explanation fits well 
with there being no change in response to N sentences when the modified MN sentences 
occurred before the unmodified ones in Experiment 2. Since the reason for not believing 
“All MN are P” is that one believes that there are no MNs, exposure to “All MN are P” 
should not influence your confidence in “All N are P”. 
It follows from this account that people should produce more inverse conjunction 
fallacies if there is reason to doubt the existence of the MN class. In our materials, there are 
clearly better reasons to doubt the existence of some MN (jungle ravens for example) than 
others (uncomfortable handmade sofas, or thin polyester shirts). Accordingly we had three 
independent judges rate whether or not they thought that the MN of the target sentences did 
actually exist. They all agreed that 15 did exist, and that 4 did not, and there was 
disagreement about the remaining 9. Therefore the account offered here would not apply to 
the majority of our sentences. Correlation between number of judges agreeing that the MN 
did not exist and the size of the fallacy effect across items in our initial experiments was 
-.18 for Experiment 1 and +0.18 for Experiment 2, neither of which were significant. In 
Experiment 4, there was no difference at all in the mean difference in acceptance of 
unmodified and modified sentences for those 21 pairs that were considered by most judges 
to exist and those 7 pairs considered not to exist (12.7% vs 12.8%). Nor were the results of 
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Experiment 5 affected (46% vs 47% preferring the unmodified sentence in each case).  
Finally the items of questionable existence actually showed less fallacious responding (6%) 
in Experiment 6 than the rest (14%). There was therefore no evidence that referential failure 
played a role in any of our results. 
Pragmatic interpretation of “All”. Our final account concerns the interpretation of the 
quantification of the statements. Exaggeration is a common device in everyday language 
use (we do it all the time, and we mean literally all the time), so people may be taking a 
pragmatic position in which “all” is not taken to mean “all without exception”. Once 
quantification becomes “almost all”, then there are much weaker constraints on whether 
one can believe N while disbelieving MN. However, Experiment 4 made evident that the 
inverse conjunction fallacy is not restricted to ‘all’. In fact, we observed no significant 
differences between “all”, “all-always”, “every single” and “100%” when it comes to 
participants tendency to perform the fallacy.  In none of the conditions did the incidence of 
the effect drop to zero. 
More importantly, saying that there is a certain looseness with how quantifiers such as 
‘all’ are interpreted, provides at most a redescription of the phenomenon without really 
explaining why the particular pattern of responses is obtained, or why it should be reduced 
in Experiment 6. So in order to provide an explanation of the inverse conjunction fallacy 
this account has to be supplemented in some way. The account in terms of intensional 
reasoning explains neatly why changing the apparent force of quantifiers should have little 
effect.  Unless the subset relation is made highly salient, as when the sentences are placed 
side-by-side and each is judged true or false in turn, people turn to their intensional 
representations and avoid considerations of sets and subsets. 
Conclusions 
The explanation of the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy that we favor in the end is that 
people are poor at judging the truth of universally quantified statements because the human 
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knowledge system seems to have no generally reliable way of accessing the information 
needed for telling whether such statements are true or false, (outside of the realm of 
concepts with stipulated definitions). Proving a contingent universally quantified statement 
true in logic requires an exhaustive search for counterexamples and a subsequent failure to 
find any. In the case of a set with a known finite number of members, then this can be 
easily done.  We can know that all months of the year have at least 28 days, or that all past 
US presidents are male. For everyday concept classes however we do not have this type of 
set.  Not possessing an easily searchable exemplar space, we rely instead on the strength 
with which the predicate is represented as part of our concept.  When the concept is 
modified with an atypical modifier, then the strength of the properties composing the 
concept prototype is reduced, and so we are less likely to endorse the predicate as true.  We 
are subsequently prone to deviate from the logical norm for reasoning about category 
properties, unless the subset relation is made highly salient by placing the two sentences 
side-by-side (Experiment 6).  Even then, if we are asked to say which is more true as in 
Experiment 5, we still prefer the general unmodified sentence with its higher feature 
strength. 
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Appendix 
1) Target Sentences Used in all Experiments (with appropriate changes by condition). 
Unmodified Subject Modified Subject Predicate 
All candles All expensive purple candles are made of wax 
All caterpillars All Canadian poisonous caterpillars have many legs 
All coins All old Egyptian coins are made of metal 
All coyotes All old white coyotes howl 
All crocodiles All albino African crocodiles are dangerous 
All ducks All baby Peruvian ducks have webbed feet 
All hamsters All dark-skinned savannah hamsters are furry 
All kites All silk weather kites have strings 
All lambs All dirty German lambs are friendly 
All nectarines All genetically manipulated giant nectarines grow on trees 
All ostriches All Paleolithic European ostriches have long necks 
All pearls  All oval South Sea pearls are hard 
All penguins All solitary migrant penguins are black and white 
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All pigs All wild Samoan pigs can be turned into pork chops 
All ravens All young jungle ravens are black 
All refrigerators All inexpensive commercial refrigerators can be used for storing food 
All rhubarb All homegrown Albanian rhubarb is grown for food 
All saxophones All expensive hand-made saxophones are made of brass 
All shacks All Appalachian stake-out shacks are made for storage 
All shirts All thin polyester shirts can be worn for warmth 
All sinks All round antique sinks can retain water 
All sofas All uncomfortable handmade sofas have back rests 
All squirrels All black Nicaraguan squirrels eat nuts 
All storks All domestic hybrid storks have long legs 
All thimbles All Belgian painted thimbles are worn for protection 
All tissues All medical tissues are made of paper 
All tortoises All South American fighting tortoises are slow 
All wagons All futuristic fruit wagons are used by pulling them 
 
2) True Filler sentences used in Experiments 1 and 2 
All triangles have three corners.    
All computers are electronic.    
All cars have wheels.    
All large explosions are dangerous.    
All fish can swim.   
All birds are animals.    
All bachelors are unmarried.    
All humans breathe air. 
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3) Filler sentences used in Experiment 3 
True Fillers 
All dusty illustrated books are books 
All crunchy red apples are apples 
All half-full water bottles are bottles 
All long curly hair is hair 
All square traditional tables are tables 
All great brick walls are walls 
All sturdy triangular containers are containers 
All smart buttoned shirts are shirts 
All short bent carrots are carrots 
All hand-painted grey cups are cups 
False (privative) fillers 
All handwritten counterfeit leases are leases 
All plastic replica guns are guns 
All long false noses are noses 
All beautiful unreal fish are fish 
All obviously fake tickets are tickets 
All petite ceramic trees are trees 
All bogus company shares are shares 
All miniature toy elephants are elephants 
All unconvincing mock lions are lions 
All large-scale simulated operations are operations 
All alluring pseudo-sciences are sciences 
All carved wooden birds are birds 
All shiny imitation leather is leather 
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All friendly imaginary persons are persons 
All small phony alarm-clocks are alarm-clocks 
All implausible fictitious animals are animals 
All green artificial flowers are flowers 
All long forged prescriptions are prescriptions 
All fabricated historical knowledge is knowledge 
All unemployed ex-mayors are mayors 
All corrupt past chiefs of police are chiefs of police 
All tasty chocolate rabbits are rabbits 
All impressive steel flowers are flowers 
All friendly pretend pirates are pirates  
All hard plastic lemons are lemons 
All ugly bronze kittens are kittens  
All frightening hallucinatory spiders are spiders 
All former England captains are captains 
 
4) Filler sentences used in Experiment 4 (with quantifier appropriate to condition) 
All advanced portable computers are electronic 
All large furry mammals have hearts 
All birds are animals 
All small red triangles have three corners 
All chairs can be used to sit on 
All trained bottlenosed dolphins are intelligent 
All bachelors are unmarried 
All humans breathe with gills 
All scientists are good at abstract reasoning 
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All long black cars have propellers 
All small silent explosions are dangerous 
All actors are strong 
 
5) Filler sentences used for Experiments 5 and 6 
Unmodified is more true Modified is more true 
All beautiful unreal fish use gills to breathe All dry paper bags are flammable 
All carved wooden birds fly* All fresh green cucumbers are crunchy. 
All friendly pretend pirates are criminals All funny children’s books are illustrated 
All frightening hallucinatory spiders spin webs All large starved alligators are dangerous 
All green artificial flowers are organic All long gold chains are valuable 
All hard plastic lemons are edible All new luxurious cars are expensive 
All miniature toy elephants drink water All old sewer rats carry diseases 
All plastic replica guns are dangerous All ripe apples are sweet 
All tasty chocolate rabbits run fast All square medium-sized stones are used for 
construction* 
All ugly bronze kittens purr All sweet fruit pies are eaten for desert 
All unconvincing mock lions are carnivores All thin glass bottles are fragile 
 
* replaced in Experiment 6 by 
All carved wooden birds hatch from eggs  
All large quarried stones are heavy 
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Footnotes 
1. The term “fallacy” is not intended to imply that it is irrational to violate these laws, or 
even that people generally try to act in accordance with them. These effects are fallacies 
only in terms of the laws of logic and statistics. If no further motivation for acting in 
accordance with these laws exists, it could very well be rational to break them. As 
Gilbert Harman (2002) suggests, if you are starving and have just discovered an 
inconsistency in your beliefs, the rational thing to do might not be to try to resolve the 
inconsistency but to find something to eat (unless of course you have reason to suppose 
that the inconsistency in your beliefs is the cause of your starvation in the first place).  
2. Participants were randomly assigned to Experiments 1 or 2, which were run at the same 
time, and in the same group testing situation, so a comparison between the experiments 
is fully justified. 
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Table 1 
Total frequencies and percentages of combined answers to sentence pairs in Experiment 2 
  Modified sentence MN 
  Yes No 
Unmodified Sentence N Yes 
 
154  
55% 
56 
20% 
No 
 
21 
8% 
47 
17% 
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Table 2 
Total frequencies of combined answers to sentence pairs in Experiment 6 
  Modified sentence MN 
  Yes No 
Unmodified Sentence N Yes 
 
318 
60% 
64 
12% 
No 
 
21 
4% 
126 
24% 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1 
Proportion of yes responses for unmodified and modified sentences (top panel), and mean 
confidence ratings (bottom panel) for yes and no responses separately in Experiment 4.  
Error Bars show 95% Confidence Intervals. 
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